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"SUBJECT TO CONTRACT" NOT SUBJECT TO CONTRACT: THE RUGBY GROUP LTD V PROFORCE RECRUIT LTD 

arrow Date: 23.02.2005

The words "subject to contract" are universally used by the sender of a document as a means of avoiding the recipient of that document being able to accept the terms of the "offer", and thereby bind the sender to those terms.  A recent case has however highlighted the dangers of assuming that the use of such terminology is the end of the matter.  It serves as a cautionary tale to all of us that if parties then proceed to act on the basis that the terms contained in the document are binding, a Court may then determine that they are. 

A proposal from one party to another of terms clearly marked “subject to contract” has recently been found to be a valid and enforceable contract. On 2 February 2005 in The Rugby Group Limited v ProForce Recruit Limited [2005] EWHC 70 (QB), the high court allowed an appeal from The Rugby Group ("Rugby") to grant summary judgment against ProForce Recruit Ltd ("ProForce") in its claim for breach of contract.

ProForce had claimed that, despite the “subject to contract” heading, the document marked "Subject to Contract" was enforceable because the parties had then acted in a way which was consistent with the agreement set out in the document being in force.   It also claimed that Rugby had breached it by failing to honour the “preferred supplier status” conferred on ProForce in one of the proposed terms.  For the purposes of this note, it is the status which the Court accorded to the "subject to contract" document which is of importance.

The Court accepted that in general, except in a very strong and exceptional case, the words “subject to contract” would usually prevent a binding agreement coming into force. It appears, however, that the Court regarded this case as “strong and exceptional”.  The reason the Court gave in this instance was that after the document was signed, the parties then did “those things that the agreement contemplated that each should do for the benefit of the other”. The Court therefore found that the parties had by their actions entered into an implied binding contract on the terms of the agreement.  This is consistent with a long line of authorities which have held that a formal offer (i.e. one that is not "subject to contract") could be accepted by conduct. 

It seems then that the standard insertion of the words “subject to contract” at the top of the first page of a document may actually be held to mean “not subject to contract” if the parties then act as if the proposal were a binding agreement. This case is a strong judicial endorsement of “substance over style” in commercial contracts and should serve as a warning to those who, after having sent such a document, then fail to complete and finalise agreements before actually beginning work under the auspices of the "subject to contract" document.  If a final agreement is never subsequently concluded, the Court may bind the parties to a "subject to contract" document as the best (possibly the only) evidence of what the parties intended to be the terms of the agreement between them.

Tom Frederikse
Jonathan Coad

 

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